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Australasian Torrens Automation, Its Integrity, and the 
Three Proof Requirements 
ROD THOMAS, ROUHSHI LOW AND LYNDEN GRIGGS 
New Zealand and Australia are leading the world in terms of automated land registry systems. 
Landonline was introduced some ten years ago for New Zealand, and the Electronic 
Conveyancing National Law (ECNL) is to be released over the next few years in support of a 
national electronic conveyancing system to be used throughout Australia. With the assistance 
of three proof requirements, developed for this purpose, this article measures the integrity of 
both systems as against the old, manual Torrens system. The authors take the position that any 
introduced system should at least have the same level of integrity and safety as the originally 
conceived manual system. The authors argue both Landonline and ECNL, as presently set up, 
have less credibility than the manual system as it was designed to operate, leading to the 
possibility of increased fraud or misuse. 
I  Introduction 
Land registration affects every citizen. A dysfunctional conveyancing process will hit the hip pocket 
of consumers, in that a less secure land title system will cause higher conveyancing transactional fees 
and higher insurance premia, and detrimentally affect the security of business transactions.1 This is 
especially the case in a Torrens regime2 where, once registration is achieved, the title of the registrant 
is protected and guaranteed by the state. The results can therefore be catastrophic for a dispossessed 
owner as he or she will be left with only a possible compensation claim unless the newly registered 
owner was fraudulent in obtaining registered status.3 
Thus while “Torrens protected registration” would rarely enter the lexicon of consumers, the 
design of automated land registration schemes is an appropriate subject for close examination. This 
article aims to do that in respect New Zealand and Australia. In New Zealand, Landonline has been in 
place since 2003. Australia is about to introduce ECNL to facilitate introduction of a national 
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 electronic conveyancing system (NECS), which will be applicable in every separate Australian 
Torrens jurisdiction.4 
To give context to this discussion we have adopted the standpoint that any new system should at 
least be as credible as the old manual system. Thus whilst imperatives for increased speed of 
registration, ease of access and cost saving to practitioners are understood, we need to understand how 
the operation of an automated system affects basic Torrens concepts that a title is good and protected 
except in the case of fraud which is brought home to the new registered title holder. 
To undertake this analysis we use what we term as three “proof requirements.” These are tools we 
have developed to provide an objective means for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the two 
systems and how they measure against the old manual system. 
This article takes the following format. First, we explain how we arrived at the three proof 
requirements and why we consider they provide a useful measuring tool. They are then applied to 
assess the fundamentals of the old manual Torrens system as it was originally conceived. By this 
discussion, we are able to conclude that changes over the last 100 or more years have debased the 
integrity of the manual system as it was designed to operate. By use of the three proof requirements, 
we comfortably conclude that the manual system does not now satisfy current demands for a sound 
and reliable system. The two automated systems, being Landonline and the proposed NECS, are then 
introduced and explained in conceptual terms. Their operation is also measured against the three proof 
requirements. 
By way of illustration of the utility of the three proof requirements, the facts of three recent 
examples of abuse of Torrens registration are given. These are the Perrin5 and Mildenhall frauds 
perpetrated respectively in Queensland and Western Australia and, for New Zealand, the facts of 
Warin v Registrar-General of Land.6 
We conclude with a summary of our assessment on the credibility of Landonline and the proposed 
NECS. 
II  The Three Proof Requirements 
The three proof requirements are as follows. Proof of: 
 
1. identity of applicant; 
2. ownership of the title interest; and 
3. entitlement to deal. 
 
A Proof of identity of applicant 
The person who wishes to deal with an existing interest in land needs to identify themselves. An 
argument can be made that proof of the applicant’s identity (the first proof requirement) and proof of 
ownership of the interest to be dealt with (the second proof requirement) are one proof requirement 
and not two. However, it will be argued that Landonline (and potentially other automated systems) 
place undue reliance on proof of the identity of the intended user, at the expense of proof of 
ownership of the interest being dealt with. This may be a reflection that identity fraud is an issue of 
international concern. Misuse of credit cards, bank accounts, passports or other online systems often 
centre on theft of identity issues.7 However, at the end of the day, a passport or a drivers licence 
issued in the name of John Smith, properly understood, is evidence only that the John Smith before 
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 you has a passport or driver’s licence issued in his name. It is not, by itself, best proof (or indeed any 
proof at all) that the John Smith before you is the same John Smith who asserts ownership of an 
interest he claims (the second proof requirement) or has a right to deal with the interest (the third 
proof requirement). 
This first proof requirement is not seen as being an inherently “Torrens related” issue. However 
under a deeds based system, operating in a different era, identity issues were perhaps a less complex 
issue. It may be that in the 19th century, sufficient evidence that the person before you was John 
Smith might have been provided by the fact the person had possession of unique title deeds issued in 
the name of John Smith. 
B Proof of ownership of the title interest 
Having established the party wishing to undertake an automated dealing is “John Smith”, the issue 
arises as to whether John Smith is the same “John Smith” who owns the interest he or she wishes to 
deal with. To make the point another way, to operate a bank account opened in the name of John 
Smith, John Smith should have to prove the bank account is his. This is an additional requirement to 
producing a driver’s licence proving he is John Smith. 
The issue of proof of ownership provides unique challenges in the automated environment where 
any system is intended to operate solely “online”. 
C Proof of entitlement to deal 
The issue of entitlement to deal is multifaceted. Three relevant categories of problems in this regard 
are identified in this article. There may be others. Those identified are transfers that are: 
 
 made by parties who lack legal capacity; or 
 in contravention of legal requirements; or 
 made without authority being obtained from a title custodian. 
 
Each of these categories is separate from the others, but they all involve the issue of entitlement to 
deal. In the first category may be a conveyance by a minor or other party who lacks capacity. Further 
illustrations may be a bankrupt, or a trust operating in contravention to the terms of its trust deed. In 
the second category may be a conveyance of land set aside as a public reserve, or land that cannot 
legally be dealt with without some form of statutory consent process to be first undertaken as a 
precondition to transfer. An example of this may be a statutory prohibition against acquisition by 
foreign nationals of significant national assets without prior government consent. 
In both categories the transaction may be willingly undertaken by the true title owner, but the 
dealing will either be void or voidable at law through lack of an entitlement to deal.8 Further the 
recipient of the dealing may not be aware of the voidable nature of the dealing. 
Both these categories have particular relevance under any Torrens system. This is because in the 
absence of fraud a registered title is made “indefeasible” by state guarantee.9 Consequently, the 
accepted dealing is “good,” notwithstanding that it offends the “nemo dat” principle in terms of the 
effect of irregular transactions at general law,10 or is land protected by statute from unauthorised 
dealings due to its special character or vulnerability, such as reserve land. 
The third category is different. It concerns a party who has the right to control registration. An 
example of this is found under the old manual operation of the Torrens system, where the first 
registered mortgagee was entitled to retain the outstanding duplicate title, thus controlling subsequent 
dealings being registered. This will be discussed further in the next section of this article. 
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 This third proof requirement, proof of entitlement to deal, is often not perceived as a key issue 
under any Torrens system, separate from proof of ownership. This is for the simple reason that in 
straightforward land dealings, proof of ownership is often, by itself, all the necessary proof needed to 
establish an entitlement to deal.11 
III  Fundamentals of the Old Manual System 
The manual system was designed to operate in a paper-based environment, very different from 
expectations we now have. Today, in an era where cyberspace is the location most regularly visited by 
the people of this planet, we have an expectation of being able to access immediate “online systems”, 
often from the comfort of our homes. Imposed from the 1860s onwards, Torrens paper-based regimes 
were operated by registration staff processing manually submitted paper dealings under administrative 
powers and functions set out in the relevant Torrens legislation.12 
The concept of a state-protected form of title was then, and to some extent surely remains, 
revolutionary. With New Zealand as the illustration, but with an appreciation that most Torrens 
systems provided for similar requirements, we examine some of the protections originally put in place 
to protect the Register from inappropriate registration. The discussion takes place in terms of the three 
proof requirements. 
The protections we identify are as follows: 
 
a. authorised witnessing being required for documents to be presented for registration; 
b. production of the outstanding duplicate of the state-issued certificate of title as authority to 
register; 
c. certification by the party taking the benefit of the dealing that the dealing was “correct for the 
purpose of the Land Transfer Act”; and 
d. active policing by Registry staff in accepting dealings for registration against misuse or abuse of 
the system. 
 
From the 1960s onwards, these protective measures, conceived to operate in 19th century conditions, 
weakened with advances in technology, exacerbated to a considerable degree by the pioneering work 
of Sir Tim Berners-Lee with respect to the Internet.13 The world is now a much smaller place. The 
original controls developed to protect the Register no longer have currency and have become 
degraded as a form of meaningful protection.14 
The protective controls, as developed for the paper based system, operated as follows. 
A Authorised witnessing of documents to be presented for registration 
A dealing presented for registration had to be witnessed by an authorised witness whose witnessing 
was a certification to the Registry of the identity of the signatory.15 In many registries, the class of 
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 acceptable witnesses was limited.16 An oath or statutory declaration was required from any witness 
who did not belong to this authorised class.17 This enabled the Registrar to call on the witness to query 
the identity of the applicant or make due inquiry as to the proper execution of the document. 
An authorised witness, being a solicitor or bank officer, would be taken to have acted responsibly. 
He or she would satisfy themselves as to the identity of the person executing the document, and this 
knowledge may even have been intended to have extended to the second proof requirement, 
knowledge of ownership of land or interest.18 The importance of a limited class of authorised 
witnesses was certainly intended to extend to aspects of the third proof requirement, proof of 
entitlement to deal. In this regard, if a dealing appeared questionable, a witness could be required by 
the Registry to affirm that the signatory of the document was “of sound mind” and “freely and 
voluntarily sign[ed]” the instrument to be registered”.19 
How effective were these measures as a tangible form of protection of the Register? It could be 
argued that even from inception, a Registrar would infrequently call in a witness to confirm that the 
execution of a dealing was valid. However, the ability for the Registrar to query registration in this 
manner protected the Register. It produced an industry standard; an expectation of compliance with 
set standards. 
Over time, increased commercial activities, complexities of dealings and diversity of land 
ownership placed stresses on assumptions that witnesses would have the necessary knowledge to 
provide such confirmation. Thus, the New Zealand Registry (and others) dispensed with the need for 
authorised witnesses prior to the introduction of automation, in recognition that this protection of the 
Registry became of negligible value.20 
B Production of the outstanding duplicate title 
Under the manual system, as originally conceived, possession of a Registry-issued duplicate copy of 
the Register title had real significance. The Torrens legislation provided that production of this 
document was conclusive proof: it was to be “received in all courts of law and equity as evidence of 
the particulars therein set forth [and as] conclusive evidence [of ownership]”.21 Given the uniqueness 
of this document, by virtue of being in possession of the duplicate title a person could assert proof of 
ownership. 
A dealing could not, in most cases, be accepted for registration without being accompanied by 
production of the outstanding duplicate title.22 Thus possession of this document acted both as proof 
of ownership and also as proof of entitlement to deal. In this latter regard the first mortgagee would, 
as part of the security, be entitled to possession of the outstanding duplicate, and thus be in a position 
to control future registration.23 
In some respects the status of the outstanding duplicate title mirrored the deeds system, where 
mere possession of title deeds could be construed as the evidencing the creation of an equitable charge 
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copy of the Register, if the certified copy was different on content. See Adams, above n 16, at [111]. 
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 or mortgage security over the land.24 However, under the Torrens system this concept translated to 
possession of the duplicate being retained as a pledge until payment of a debt was satisfied. The 
possession of the outstanding duplicate was in the nature of a security, but one that fell short of being 
a mortgage charge.25 
The introduction of photocopiers into commercial office use from the 1960s onwards steadily 
diminished the relevance of the outstanding duplicate, both as evidence of ownership and as evidence 
of an entitlement to deal. Photocopiers enabled an exact copy of the duplicate or Register original to 
be made. A number of images of the title could legitimately be in circulation at any time. This risk 
was exacerbated following the advent of personal computers, with the ability to scan exact copies of 
documents.26 Forgeries could therefore be undertaken with some impunity in a way not previously 
tenable as the forger would not previously have had ready access to means of making exact copies of 
either the Register or the outstanding duplicate. This development naturally devalued the existence of 
the duplicate.27 Credibility of the outstanding duplicate was consequently reduced to issues such as 
quality of approved paper or the colour of ink used on it by Registry staff. In more recent times, some 
registries sought to ensure credibility by either imbedding authentication codes into the outstanding 
duplicate or attaching thermochromic icons. 
C Certification by the party taking the benefit that the dealing was “correct for the purpose of 
the Land Transfer Act” 
In New Zealand, as in the majority of Australasian Torrens jurisdictions,28 certification that the 
[dealing] “is correct for the purposes of [the Land Transfer Act]” was signed either by the solicitor for 
the transferee or by the party taking the benefit under the dealing.29 The penalty for a false or 
negligent certification was a then very significant penalty of 50 pounds.30 As worded, the Registrar 
was able to rely on this certification as satisfying the third proof requirement, “entitlement to deal”. 
This can be criticised as placing the onus on the wrong party.31 The party deriving the benefit may not 
know of any irregularity by the applicant in undertaking the dealing. However, the significant penalty 
of 50 pounds suggests that the drafters of the 1870 Land Transfer Act expected that the certifier would 
take his or her duties seriously, to the extent of fully exploring issues such as the identity of the party 
transferring or creating the interest, whether that party owned the title interest, and issues concerning 
entitlement to deal. 
Arguably the significance of the certificate was never fully understood. This may be amply 
illustrated by the fact that there are no known cases involving convictions of any party giving an 
                                                 
24  PV Baker and P St J Langan Snell’s Equity (29th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1990) at 444. J & H Just (Holdings) 
Pty Ltd v The Bank of New South Wales (1971) 125 CLR 546 (HCA) is an example of this. This equitable concept is 
given statutory recognition in Queensland: Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 75; in the Northern Territories: Land Title Act 
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27  Robbie Muir “Electronic Registration: The Legislative Scheme and Implications for the Torrens System in New 
Zealand” in David Grinlinton (ed) Torrens in the Twenty-first Century (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2003) 311 at 318. 
28  BE Hayes “The Certificate of Correctness under the Land Transfer Act” (April–May 2006) Land Information New 
Zealand <www.linz.govt.nz> at 1. 
29  Land Transfer Act, s 164. 
30  Land Transfer Act 1870, s 112. In the Land Transfer Act 1952, s 164(3) this is now $100. In October 2012 terms the 
sum of 50 pounds equals approximately $183,400. 
31  The importance of this is signified by s 164(1) of the present New Zealand Land Transfer Act 1952 which provides 
“any other person who is a party to the instrument or claims any interest thereunder or in respect thereof” has the ability 
to apply to the High Court for an order granting “authority to certify that the instrument is correct”. The Court may 
make such an order if it is “satisfied that it is just and expedient that the authority be granted”. 
 incorrect certification, nor any known case of a civil claim by the Crown against a certifier.32 On 
reflection, this may positively reflect on the credibility of the other protections of the Register which 
are discussed in this article. 
The ambiguities inherent in the certification are evident from a study undertaken by Brian Hayes, 
a former New Zealand Registrar-General.33 That article, commissioned in the lead-up to Landonline, 
suggests that following the acceptance of immediate indefeasibility,34 “the certificate of correctness 
[did] not now in itself [constitute] an arbiter of anything essential”35 and it was “no longer a 
determinant in the process of registration”.36 
D Active policing by Registry staff in accepting dealings for registration against misuse or 
abuse of the system 
Under the various Torrens enactments, the Registrar was invariably charged with policing the 
Register to protect it from registration of “informal” dealings not permitted by the statute; dealings not 
in appropriate form; or dealings which are either a void or voidable at law, which includes fraudulent 
dealings.37 It was:38 
 
… the Registrar’s duty to refuse to register any instrument which ex facie [was] invalid, or where there 
[was] prima facie evidence of fraud or improper dealing. Thus, if the instrument appear[ed] to be in 
contravention of statute law, he should not [have] register[ed] it. The Registrar [was] supposed to know 
the statute law, and he [could not] ignore the records in his own office. 
 
This obligation extended to policing contravention of sundry statutory enactments which may have 
relevance, protecting the Register against casually or ineptly prepared documentation and ensuring 
titles did not issue in contravention of local body subdivision constraints.39 In effect, this extended to 
an overview of compliance concerning all three proof requirements: identity of the interest holder, 
proof of ownership, as well as policing any entitlement to deal. 
In undertaking this function, the Registrar has sometimes been perceived as fulfilling a quasi-
judicial40 role, given the Registrar’s power to question and to overturn registration.41 This perception 
is assisted by the Registrar’s decisions being appealable to the Registrar-General, or directly to the 
High Court.42 The Registrar may lodge a Registrar’s caveat to police compliance with the general law 
where a Registrar is concerned a title may be at risk from irregular dealings.43 
                                                 
32  The penalty of $100  is such an exceptionally modest amount so as to make prosecution an insignificant issue. 
33  Hayes, above n 28. 
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37 Land Transfer Act, s 211(d). 
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43  Land Transfer Act, s 211(d). This power to lodge a caveat extends to “the protection of any person who is under the 
disability of infancy or unsoundness of mind or is absent from New Zealand … and also to prohibit the dealing with any 
land …in which it appears to him that an error has been made by misdescription of that land or otherwise in any 
certificate of title or other instrument, or for the prevention of any fraud or improper dealing”. 
 Under the manual Torrens system, experienced Registry staff were trained to look for anomalies 
when undertaking registration.44 Concerns could arise through any number of discrepancies between 
the submitted dealing and the registered state of the title. The location of the land (evident from the 
Register) may indicate the land had protected status; the scale or the physical layout of the land 
depicted on the title diagram represented on the face of the Register may suggest the land had unique 
characteristics; the nature of prior recorded dealings may indicate the land had some form of protected 
or special status (such as Housing Corporation land); the length of time since any last dealing was 
registered could indicate the land was trust land; the spelling of proprietors’ names, the legal 
appellation given for the land, or the number of current registered proprietors could indicate the land 
was Māori land registered under the Land Transfer Act (requiring a court order before it could be 
alienated); the nature of prior registered dealings such as easements for special purposes could 
indicate the land had a particular character (perhaps production of geothermal energy); or the identity 
of the current or prior registered proprietor could indicate land as having a unique or protected 
status.45 
On the issue of whether duplicate titles presented as an authority to register were authentic, under 
the manual system Registry staff would take note of the quality and colour of the card used for the 
document, the authenticity of known existing Registrars’ signatures on prior title memorials, and even 
the colour of ink used to make entries on the duplicate.46 
The nature and care taken over acceptance of dealings for registration, combined with a perhaps 
overzealous protection of the Register, could make timely registration problematic. This was 
exacerbated by the requirement to register dealings in the order they were presented for registration.47 
A combination of both of these could lead to a backlog of registration resulting in significant gaps 
occurring between settlement and registration.48 Over time this trend was exacerbated by pressures 
resulting from increased commercial activity leading to an inability to achieve prompt registration. In 
such situations the purchaser will have paid over the purchase price at “settlement” (not a term 
envisaged under the original Torrens precepts as having a separate identity from registration).49 
However registration still had to be achieved. Pending this occurring, the purchaser remained 
vulnerable to possible third-party claims.50 
Under the intended operation of the Torrens system, as conceived, such delays were never 
envisaged.51 Such delays, being cumulative, ultimately had an adverse effect on the credibility of the 
Register as reflecting current land ownership. In New Zealand, the gap between settlement and 
registration could be such that the legislature was forced to introduce the concept of a “guaranteed 
search” being obtained by the registrant before settlement which protected his or her risk against any 
third party dealing, by providing compensation if the registration was ultimately defeated.52 
                                                 
44  One of the co-authors was in the distant past employed at a registry, having signing authority to register dealings. 
45  For example, within the Auckland Registry, it was known that land owned by the current trustees of James Dilworth’s 
estate could not be alienated without a court order being obtained. 
46  Many Registry staff were employed for a significant number of years undertaking registration roles; some from school 
through to retirement. Thus they naturally became attuned to dealing with title issues and recognising anomalies. 
Assisting with this process was the development of “title files” held within the Registry records for titles which had 
proved to be of interest in the past. These “off register” notes and correspondence were recorded for future internal 
Registry consumption. Within the experience of one of the authors, a fraud was discovered in the Registry because the 
wrong coloured ink was discovered on the presented outstanding duplicate title. Black not blue ink was invariably used 
by the Registry staff in making title entries to ensure clarity on photocopying. 
47  Land Transfer Act, s 37. 
48  RP Thomas “Land Transfer Fraud and Unregistered Interests” (1994) 2 NZ Recent Law Review 218 at 231. In IAC 
(Finance) Pty Ltd v Courtenay [1963] 110 CLR 550 (HCA) at 580 the delay was up to 12 months. 
49  Thomas, above n 48, at 231. 
50  For example, see Jacobs v Platt Nominees Pty Ltd [1990] VR 146 (SC). 
51  Rod Thomas “Fraud, Risk and the Automated Register” in David Grinlinton (ed) Torrens in the Twenty-first Century 
(Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2003) 349 at 350. 
52  Land Transfer Act, s 172A. 
 The notoriety of delays in registration being achieved has been a clear driver for the development 
of an automated Register.53 However, while much dialogue has emphasised the benefits of automation 
in terms of increased speed of registration, cost savings and ready access to the Register,54 continuing 
issues as to the integrity of the Register have not received the same prominence.55 
E Comments on risk 
The introduction of the Torrens system has been heralded as one of the “great legal reforms of the 
19th century”.56 It clearly offered a better form of title than the deeds system it replaced. Reported 
instances of fraud showed a pattern of isolated occurrences of abuse and error. Thus, in general terms 
the manual system, as it was designed for 19th century conditions, can be argued to have been very 
successful. 
In summary, we table the performance of the old manual system, as it was initially designed, 
against the three proof requirements as follows: 
 
Proof Requirements Protections in the old manual system 
Identity of applicant Sound protection. Authorised witnessing of documents presented for 
registration, certification by the party taking the benefit, production 
of the outstanding duplicate, and policing by Registry staff.  
Proof of ownership Sound protection, especially preceding the advent of photocopiers 
and computers. Authorised witnessing; production of the 
outstanding duplicate, certification by the party taking the benefit, 
and policing by Registry staff.  
Entitlement to deal Sound protection. Authorised witnessing of documents, production 
of the outstanding duplicate, certification by the party taking the 
benefit, and policing by Registry staff. The success of these 
measures is arguably a key feature of the success of the manual 
system — to the extent that “entitlement to deal” is often not 
suggested to be an issue in terms of the operation of a manual 
Torrens system. In New Zealand an exception to this may be Māori 
Land which will be discussed further. 
Assessment Sound protection.  The various measures introduced resulted in an 
overprotection of the Register, reflecting the significance of the 
grant of indefeasability protection by the state. 
 
IV  Automated Systems 
A Landonline 
Landonline was introduced into operation by Land Information New Zealand (LINZ)57 in 2003.58 The 
need for an outstanding duplicate title, and indeed the production of any paper instruments in the 
                                                 
53  Greenwood and Jones, above n 14, at 323, 328. 
54  Muir, above n 27, at 311 reflects as follows. “The ability to electronically lodge and instantly register title transactions 
will revolutionise conveyancing practice.” See also New Zealand Law Society, LawTalk no 627 (New Zealand, 28 June 
2004). 
55  Thomas, above n 51; Benito Arruñada “Leaky title syndrome?” [2010] NZLJ 115; Thomas, above n 1. 
56  Law Commission, above n 13, at iv; foreword by Sir Geoffrey Palmer, President of the NZ Law Commission. 
57  Land Information New Zealand [LINZ] is now the New Zealand government department responsible for the Land 
Registry. 
58  Tom Bennion and others New Zealand Land Law (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2009) at [3.1]. 
 registration process, are dispensed with.59 The Registry is a virtual registry, accessed by 
“practitioners”60 who, for most dealings, are licensed by the Registrar-General to operate the system 
without intervention.61 Indeed, it is mandatory for practitioners to use this automated system, even 
though the manual system still exists for individuals undertaking private conveyancing.62 
A practitioner may therefore transfer or deal with most routine title interests without involvement 
of Registry staff, or indeed any other third party.63 Providing the transferee is not found guilty of land 
transfer fraud,64 and no in personam rights exist as between the transferor and the transferee, the 
registration will be successful.65 Thus the transferee obtains good title against the world. 
The Registrar relies on a certification and indemnification by the “practitioner” that the dealing is 
appropriate for registration.66 This goes to all three of the three proof requirements: identity of the 
interest holder, proof of ownership of land and entitlement to deal. To facilitate this, s 164A(3) of the 
Land Transfer Act 1952 was enacted in the following terms (emphasis added): 
 
Certifications must specify that— 
(a)  the person giving the certification has authority to act for the party specified in regulations in 
relation to that class of instrument and that party has legal capacity to give such authority; and 
(b)  the person giving the certification has taken reasonable steps to confirm the identity of the person 
who gave the authority to act; and 
(c)  the instrument complies with any statutory requirements specified by the Registrar for that class of 
instrument; and 
(d)  the person giving the certification has evidence showing the truth of the certifications in paragraphs 
(a) to (c) and that the evidence will be retained for the period prescribed for the purpose by 
regulations made under this Act. 
 
It is argued that these certifications are unsatisfactory. In particular they deal only indirectly with the 
second proof requirement, proof of ownership of the title interest.67 This remains the case, 
notwithstanding one of the authors’ earlier criticism in this regard.68 The certifications directly deal 
only with the other two proof requirements. These are proof of identity of the applicant (s 164A(3)(b)) 
and proof of entitlement to deal (s 164A(3)(c)). 
(1) First proof requirement 
The requirement to “confirm the identity of the person who gave the authority to act” (s 164A(3)(b), 
emphasis added) is satisfied by compliance with the Registrar-General’s published Standard for 
Verification,69 which is supported by the New Zealand Law Society E-Dealing Guidelines.70 Under 
                                                 
59  Bennion and others, above n 58, at [3.4.02]. 
60  Land Transfer (Computer Registers and Electronic Lodgement) Amendment Act 2002, s 4; definition of “practitioner”. 
61  There is provision for some dealings to “step down” from “auto reg” to “lodge”. Some dealings are always set at 
“lodge”, such as caveats, or dealings required to  facilitate a subdivision. The documents for these dealings are scanned 
and e-mailed to the Registry who then processes them for registration. See Land Information New Zealand “e-dealing 
User Guide” Landonline <www.landonline.govt.nz/edealing/training-resources> at 233. 
62  Bennion and others, above n 58, at [3.4]. Dealings lodged by the paper system have to be submitted by post. Thus a 
disparity is created with automated registration which is “instantaneous”. 
63  Thomas, above n 51, at 355. 
64  Thomas, above n 1, at 719-726, 735–736. 
65  Thomas, above n 51, at 355. 
66  Greenwood and Jones, above n 14, at 330. 
67  These certifications are underpinned by more detailed requirements in the Land Transfer Regulations 2002, regs 11–13. 
These will be referred to further in the discussion that follows. 
68  Thomas, above n 51, at 364. 
69  LINZ Standard for verification of identity for registration under the Land Transfer Act 1952 (11 February 2011) 
<www.linz.govt.nz>. 
70  New Zealand Law Society, Propery Law Section E-Dealing Guidelines (October 2008). 
 both, for “routine transactions” identity is satisfied by production of a driver’s licence or passport, or 
other such identification. Thus the standard focuses on identification of the identity of the party 
seeking to undertake the dealing, rather than proof of that individual’s ownership of the title interest 
being conveyed.71 For overseas clients, a practitioner is entitled to have identity confirmation “carried 
out by a delegate” who “must be an independent trusted person who the practitioner can reasonably 
rely on”.72 This may be a notary public in the relevant jurisdiction.73 
(2) Second proof requirement 
The second proof requirement is proof of ownership of the actual title interest to be dealt with. This 
proof requirement is dealt with in an unsatisfactory way. Section 164A(3)(b) requires that “the person 
giving the certification has taken reasonable steps to confirm the identity of the person who gave the 
authority to act for the party specified in the regulations in regard to that class of instrument …” This 
certification needs to be understood in conjunction with reg 11 of the Land Transfer Regulations 2002 
which provides a table of the “Specified party” by descriptors such as “the Transferor”, “the Grantor” 
or “the Mortgagor.” 
This labelling is ambiguous. Does it require the practitioner to identify that the party who wishes 
to undertake the dealing is the proven title owner, or instead is the party who has given the 
instructions to act? To make the point in a way that has already been discussed, is the requirement 
imposed on the practitioner to ensure that “the Transferor” is the John Smith who has presented a 
passport of that name, or is the requirement intended to ensure that the John Smith before the 
practitioner is the same John Smith who owns the title interest to be dealt with (which is, of course, 
the second proof requirement)?74 
Further ambiguities are evident in the wording of s 164A(3)(a). It requires a certification that the 
practitioner “has authority to act for the party specified in regulations in relation to that class of 
instrument and that party has legal capacity to give such authority”. Yet again, is the “party specified” 
“the Transferor,” “the Grantor” and so on as applicable, as identified in the regulations?75 Further, a 
literal reading appears to suggest that the certificate is only intended to address the need for the 
existence of the required agency authorisation to lodge the dealing, which is a separate matter from 
the second proof requirement. 
Given the obvious importance of proving that the party seeking to deal actually owns the title 
interest, such tortuous ambiguities are unfortunate. Surely there should be a clear and unequivocal 
certification by the certifier (that is the practitioner) that he or she is satisfied on reasonable grounds 
that the party seeking to deal with the title interest owns it? 
The Registrar-General’s published Standard for Verification76 supported by the New Zealand Law 
Society E-Dealing Guidelines77 (neither of which are incorporated into the “online” Landonline 
registration system) are intended to deal with the issue of proof of ownership. However, again, they 
are unsatisfactory. For “routine transactions” proof of ownership is satisfied by production to the 
practitioner of a copy of a local body rates notice, bank statement or utilities account addressed to the 
client at the property as acceptable proof of the client’s link to the property.78 
                                                 
71  E-Dealing Guidelines, above n 70, at [J]. If the practitioner does not have personal knowledge of the “landowner”, the 
transaction is “high risk” and [5.2] of the Standard for verification of identity (above n 69) applies. This is discussed 
next under the heading “Second proof requirement”. 
72  Standard for verification of identity, above n 69, at 13: “General requirements for practitioners: Delegating verification 
of identity (a)”. 
73  Standard for verification of identity, above n 69, at 13 (c). 
74  The only exceptions in reg 11 concern esplanade strips, access strips and covenants as dealt with under specified 
provisions in the Resource Management Act 1991. Here the “Specified party” is given as “The registered proprietor”. 
75  Part 3: “Certification and execution of instruments”. 
76  Above n 69. 
77  E-Dealing Guidelines, above n 70. 
78  E-Dealing Guidelines, above n 70, at 15. See also Standard for verification of identity, above n 69, at [4.1(a)(ii)]. 
 It must be said, properly considered, production of such secondary documents is not proof of 
anything, let alone best proof. In this regard in New Zealand (as indeed must be the case in many 
overseas jurisdictions), local body rates notices, power accounts and bank statements are 
electronically produced.79 Even if the produced document was original, arguably it could have been 
intercepted in the mail.80 Alternatively, the produced document could easily have been factored 
together with little skill by an imaginative use of photocopiers and computers to create an 
approximation of an original. In an automated environment where it is reasonably accepted that the 
outstanding duplicate title no longer serves as proof of ownership, is the production of a local body 
rates notice or bank statement any advance on this? 
Under the Registrar General’s Standard for Verification and the E-Dealings Guidelines a “high 
risk” transaction is where the client is not known to the practitioner and is transferring unencumbered 
land.81 In such circumstances the practitioner is directed to undertake further steps including checking 
the historical view of the Register to identify any discrepancies in the age of the client against the 
length of period the land has been owned, contacting the owner using independently obtained 
information, or undertaking unspecified “other independent corroboration”.82 
(3) Third proof requirement 
This is perhaps one of the least satisfactory aspects of Landonline. In respect of entitlement to deal, s 
164A(3)(a) requires the “person” (practitioner) to certify that the “party” he or she acts for “has legal 
capacity to give such authority” (emphasis added). Again, there is ambiguity. Does this certification 
relate to the giving of authority from the client to certify, or does this extend to constituting a 
certification that the client has the required legal authority and capacity to deal with the land? The 
language is as unsatisfactory as is the case with the second proof requirement. In this vein the E-
Dealings Guidelines simply require practitioners to be satisfied that “the client” has legal competence 
and capacity.83 
As earlier identified, proof of entitlement extends to ensuring that the Register is protected from 
void or voidable transactions. Under Landonline, this function is made the responsibility of 
practitioners. By gazette notice the Registrar-General has published some 23 different statutory 
provisions to be complied with by practitioners before certifying that the dealing can be accepted for 
automated registration.84 However, this is an “offline” list, in the sense that the provisions are not 
itemised or individually brought to the attention of the practitioner before the certification is required. 
Instead, they are covered by the rather bland certification practitioners must give, that “statutory 
requirements specified by the Registrar for that class of instrument” have been satisfied.85 
Given the potential complexity of the 23 provisions, they are only identified in this article by their 
subject matter. They extend to: 
 
 the Burial and Cremation Act 1964; 
 the Housing Act 1955; 
 transfers of registered licenses under the Land Transfer Act 1952; 
                                                 
79  In New Zealand, local body rates are normally payable by the owner or lessee of the property: Local Government 
(Rating) Act 2002, ss 11–12. 
80  One of the authors is aware of a fraud perpetrated where the fraudster caused mail addressed to the property to be 
redirected to him, apparently in an attempt to prove ownership of land by production of original mail. 
81  Standard for verification of identity, above n 69, at [5]. 
82  Standard for verification of identity, above n 69, at [5.2]. The Standard states the protective measures are straight 
forward. At 18 the directive continues as follows: “There is no intention that practitioners are expected to go to 
unreasonable lengths to confirm client identity.” 
83  E-Dealing Guidelines, above n 70, at [I] and [M]. Such evidence is retained by the solicitor “off line”. It is not made 
part of the registration process. 
84  “Statutory Requirements, Forms of Electronic Instruments, and Requirements for the Retention of Evidence” (26 
September 2008) 144 Supplement to New Zealand Gazette 3925. 
85  The language refers back to the wording of the Land Transfer Act, s 164A(3)(c). 
  public reserve land under s 129(5) of the Land Transfer Act 1952; 
 the Māori Housing Amendment Act 1938; 
 the Māori Purposes Act 1970; 
 the Māori Purposes Act 1991; 
 the Māori Purposes Act 1993; 
 the Māori Reserved Land Act 1955; 
 the Māori Reserved Land Amendment Act 1997; 
 Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993; 
 the Mining Tenures Registration Act 1962; 
 the New Zealand Railways Corporation Restructuring Act 1990; 
 the Otago Regional Council (Kuriwao Endowment Lands) Act 1994; 
 the Public Bodies Leases Act 1969; and 
 the Reserves Act 1977. 
 
It should be noted that many of these enactments seek to protect land of special sensitivity or 
vulnerability where dealings with the land without the required consents would, at law, be a void or 
voidable transaction — but nevertheless the dealing gives valid title (in the absence of purchaser 
fraud) under standard Torrens principles.86 These are the sort of issues that experienced Land Registry 
staff would have been aware of in policing compliance. 
The very breadth of these certifications is understandable in the absence of any Registry checks. 
Indeed, the Registrar-General has termed all the certifications a “vital step” in terms of undertaking 
registration.87 In giving these undertaking, commentators have correctly identified practitioners now 
“become de facto Registrar-Generals of Land or guardians of the integrity of [the Register]”.88 
It is concerning these gazetted provisions (which may alter from time to time) are not actually 
individually listed or itemised on the Landonline website, explained to practitioners in terms of their 
effect and their consequences, or made the subject of an individual checklist in terms of the 
registration protocol.89 For many practitioners, the various legislative provisions are not commonly 
known or understood. As stated, their application requires a level of understanding previously within 
the institutional knowledge of Registry staff in operating the old, manual system.90 
(4) Issues of transference of risk 
The transference of risk to practitioners regarding the operation of Landonline is not widely 
appreciated.91 The overlapping prophylactic protections and controls of the old manual system 
(including the role of the Registry staff in auditing and checking compliance) provided a protective, 
overlying mantle on the registration process, which is no longer evident under Landonline. To suggest 
(as has been suggested) that the certification is “no more onerous” than the paper system92 overlooks 
the fact that there was real ambiguity (if not some confusion) as to what that prior certification under 
the manual system pertained to.93 It also bypasses the frank acknowledgment made prior to the 
                                                 
86  Law Commission Review of the Land Transfer Act 1952 (NZLC IP10, 2008) at [13.91] makes it clear that the e-dealing 
system relies upon certifications given by practitioners. See also [13.79(c)] and [13.100]–[13.104]: such “evidence” is 
retained on the file of the practitioner, and is not sighted by the Registry staff. In time, after the event, it may be subject 
to an audit regime. 
87  Bennion and others, above n 58, at [3.4.06]. 
88  Greenwood and Jones, above n 14, at 330. 
89  The original list was gazetted in 2002. See Thomas, above n 51, at 364. 
90  The office retained comprehensive files dealing with the application of various statutes to difficult areas of registration. 
These files would be considered from time to time when difficult registration issues occurred. 
91  See Thomas, above n 51, at 363. 
92  Greenwood and Jones, above n 14, at 335. See also Bennion and others, above n 58, at [3.4.06]; Muir, above n 27, at 
319. 
93  The present latent ambiguity concerning the content and intent of the certifications may result in a court struggling with 
issues of interpretation: see Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Heaven’s Door Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 59, (2004) 220 CLR 472 at [100]. 
 introduction of Landonline that the certification under the manual system that the “dealing was correct 
for the purposes of the Land Transfer Act” became an issue of only secondary importance (in New 
Zealand at least) following the adoption of the concept of immediate indefeasibility.94 
Indeed, the New Zealand Registrar-General has been recorded as stating that he no longer wishes 
his statutory powers of correction to be extensive, leading the New Zealand Law Commission to 
recommend that they be reduced in scope.95 
Some aspect of a pre-registration policing function remains, but it is very limited in scope. As 
from March 2012,96 LINZ indicated that any known Māori land issued with a Torrens title will 
progressively be flagged on Landonline as requiring a manual check by Registry staff before 
acceptance. Whilst this is obviously a step in the right direction, it applies only to known Māori 
land.97 Although it follows that other vulnerable title interests could also be flagged for manual 
registration,98 one may speculate that if all the title interests covered in terms of the identified 23 
statutory undertakings were flagged for manual Registry checks, much of the lauded cost savings and 
speed obtained through automated registration might be lost. 
In closing, it is of interest that the New Zealand Law Commission has proposed that a provision 
be enacted enabling the High Court to overturn registration of a void or voidable instrument where its 
registration has caused a “manifest injustice.”99 Although not expressed by the Law Commission in 
such terms, if the Register is less secure than was previously the case, some form of additional redress 
may be desirable to balance inappropriate registration more readily accepted under Landonline for 
registration.100 However, too ready a means of overturning Torrens registration runs the risk of 
reducing registration to a mere “recordation of deeds.”101 
(5) Comments on risk 
To date there are fewer known instances of outright fraud or practitioner lapses in operating 
Landonline than was the case with the manual system.102 This may lead to speculation that the 
automated system is secure, or even more secure than the manual system. 
                                                 
94  Hayes, above n 28, at 23. It is telling that post introduction of Landonline in New Zealand, practitioners were prohibited 
from using the manual system that still exists for private conveyancing. This requirement was, no doubt, to ensure that 
the new system, with its more onerous certification requirements, was well supported by practitioners and would 
succeed. See Bennion and others, above n 58, at [3.4.01]. 
95  To administrative powers only: see Law Commission, above n 13, at [2.49]. 
96  LINZ has announced release 3.7 for its Landonline, released on 19 March 2012. This includes “flagging” at the search 
stage of titles identified as potentially having the status of Māori land: see “Landonline says new release on schedule” 
(March 2012) My Law Society <my.lawsociety.org.nz>. The announcement also states: “Additional validations will be 
run on corporate and individual name fields to reduce the incidence of common errors. This is aimed at improving data 
quality and providing more accurate matching when searching using the name fields. A&I forms will also display 
correct names as a result of the validations.” 
97  Law Commission, above n 13, at [6.12] considered the issue problematic and needing to be addressed by further 
investigation. The Law Commission noted that since it had initially looked at this issue, records of Māori land would 
not, in the future, be registered automatically by Landonline. Instead, on attempting registration, the dealing would step 
down from “auto registration” to “lodge”. This would mean that the dealing would only be registered after first being 
examined by Registry staff. 
98  The Land Registry Office has a list of some 30 “Step Down Reasons” why registration would step down from “auto 
reg” to manual processing. The list concerns issues such as spelling discrepancies, presentation of wrong forms or 
internal inconsistencies being discovered in presented documentation identified by Landonline during the registration 
process. 
99  See discussion in Thomas, above n 1, at 727–747. 
100  It may be that an ability to overturn titles in the absence of proved fraud should be available. This has been proposed by 
the NZ Law Commission, but on terms that have drawn criticism. See Thomas, above n 1, at 744. 
101  Benito Arruñada Institutional Foundations of Impersonal Exchange: Theory and Policy of Contractual Registries 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2012) at 242. 
102  Thomas, above n 1, at 735, footnote 94. 
 What may not be appreciated, however, is that the two systems are not in symmetry under a risk 
assessment. Whereas under the manual system recorded fraud and abuse arose in isolated instances, 
the automated system places the practitioners (who have a personal interest in the outcome of 
registration) in the key position of being registrars, accepting the dealings for registration and 
therefore granting Torrens protection.103 Within a short period of time a single self-interested 
practitioner may wreak havoc, undertaking a concentrated series of fraudulent or negligent 
registrations over an extended number of titles without being caught.104 Again, it should be recalled 
that under conventional Torrens principles, these conveyances will be irreversible if the parties taking 
the benefit are not themselves fraudulent. The dealings are both good and protected by indefeasibility. 
Consequently, it may not matter in terms of measuring risk that there are few recorded instances 
of fraud known to date. One fraudulent or inept practitioner may suffice. Once the error is discovered, 
it could be of a magnitude that seriously damages the credibility of Landonline (and thus the Torrens 
system) in terms of consumer credibility. Thus the risk is both different and of a different magnitude. 
B Australia: NECS 
In Australia, establishing a national electronic conveyancing system (NECS) is an initiative of the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) National Partnership Agreement to Deliver a Seamless 
National Economy.105 The need for a national initiative for “E-Conveyancing” followed the failure (at 
some cost) of a 2004 Victorian initiative to introduce electronic conveyancing to only that State.106 
The National E-Conveyancing Development Limited (NECDL) was therefore formed in early 2010 to 
develop a National Electronic Conveyancing platform, on the understanding that a national standard 
of electronic conveyancing was desirable for economic benefits.107 
To give effect to NECS, the Australian Registrars’ National Electronic Conveyancing Council 
(ARNECC) was established to facilitate implementation and ongoing management of the necessary 
regulatory framework for the national electronic conveyancing system.108 The central piece in the 
regulatory framework to support NECS is the Electronic Conveyancing National Law (ECNL). This 
is therefore the main point of focus, in being the provider of the intended regulatory framework 
between the Australian States for automated land registration to occur. ECNL is being introduced as a 
national applied law scheme and has been introduced first in the host jurisdiction, New South Wales. 
The Electronic Conveyancing (Adoption of National Law) Act 2012 (NSW) was introduced in the 
NSW Legislative Council on 17 October 2012 and assented to on 20 November 2012.109 The ECNL is 
                                                 
103  Arruñada, above n 55, at 119 writes: “… savings at the registry are not informative by themselves if they are obtained 
by lowering quality or increasing the costs incurred by conveyancers”. 
104  Arruñada, above n 55, at 117. Arruñada describes this possibility as “the strengthening of average quality [or 
acceptance of dealings being] compatible with a greater risk of very poor quality in a few fraudulent transactions”. It 
may be commented that periodic audits by LINZ carried out after these events occur are beside the point. It may be 
generally assumed that fraudsters (if still present) believe they will not be caught. 
105   See Council for Australian Governments A Seamless National Economy (2 May 2013) < 
http://www.coag.gov.au/a_seamless_national_economy>. 
106  The initiative is estimated to have cost between $40 and $50 million. It failed after banks and conveyancing 
practitioners refused to participate. Banks would not utilise the system because it was not accepted by all Australian 
States. Conveyancers would not accept the system as it transferred risk to the users, leading to difficulties in obtaining 
professional indemnity insurance. See Arruñada, above n 55, at 118. 
107  National E-Conveyancing Development Limited [NECDL] is a company limited by shares and is majority government 
owned. The original members were New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria, with Western Australia subsequently 
becoming a member. States that are not members of NECDL can still use the National Electronic System by authorising 
NECDL to operate an electronic lodgement network in that jurisdiction. See the NECDL website: 
<www.necd.com.au>. 
108  See the website of the Australian Registrars’ National Electronic Conveyancing Council [ARNECC] 
<http://www.arnecc.gov.au/home>. 
109  “The jurisdictions proposed to be participating jurisdictions under the National Law are New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory”: see Electronic Conveyancing 
(Adoption of National Law) Bill 2012 (explanatory note). The Electronic Conveyancing (Adoption of National Law) 
 an appendix to this Act. The ECNL enables the creation and operation of an Electronic Lodgment 
Network (ELN) which is an electronic system that enables the lodging of Registry instruments and 
other documents in electronic form.110  
Unlike Landonline, under NECS, States have made clear there is no intention to enable a fully 
automated Register. On automated submission of the documents, the Registrar must still process the 
dealing for registration.111 
(1) First proof requirement 
Model Participation Rules have been promulgated to support the ECNL.112 Clause 6.5 of the Model 
Rules deals with verification of identity and requires the Subscriber to take reasonable steps to verify 
identity.113 This is simply to ensure that the person who asserts a right to deal is who they say they are. 
In support of this, under clause 6.5.2 of the Model Rules, compliance with the Verification of Identity 
Standard will be deemed to constitute taking reasonable steps for the purposes of clause 6.5.1. The 
Verification of Identity Standard is contained in Schedule 8 of the Model Rules. 
The requirements in Clause 6.5.1 and Schedule 8 are more onerous than the well-known 100 point 
test to open a bank account. Clause 6.5.1 requires the Subscriber to verify the identity of each Client 
Party that the Subscriber intends to represent (cl 6.5.1). Further, if the Subscriber is a mortgagee or 
represents a mortgagee, the Subscriber must verify the identity of each mortgagor (cl 6.5.1). Where 
the Subscriber represents a mortgagee the Subscriber need not take reasonable steps to verify the 
identity of each mortgagor if the mortgagee has already taken reasonable steps to verify the identity of 
the mortgagor (cl 6.5.1). Under the Verification of Identity Standard, a face-to-face interview is 
required (sch 8, cl. 2), with the Subscriber being satisfied that, where documents containing 
photographs are produced, “the Person Being Identified is a reasonable likeness (for example the 
shape of his or her mouth, nose, eyes and the position of his or her cheek bones) to the person 
depicted in those photographs” (sch 8, cl 2.2).114 
Five categories of documents are put forward as evidence of identity, with the Subscriber required 
to show that the earlier categories are unavailable before proceeding to the subsequent category (sch 
8, cl 3). For example, Category 1 provides minimum documents of an Australian passport, plus an 
Australian driver’s licenceor proof of age card, plus change of name or marriage certificate if 
necessary. Category 5, which directly relates to verification of persons who are not Australian citizens 
or residents, requires a foreign passport, plus another form of government issued photographic 
identity document plus change of name or marriage certificate if necessary. 
For verification of identity conducted in a foreign country, sch 8, cl 8 provides verification must 
be conducted by either: 
 
(a) an Australian Consular Officer or an Australian Diplomatic Officer; or 
                                                                                                                                                        
Act 2012 (Vic) was assented to on 26 February 2013 and the Electronic Conveyancing National Law (Queensland) Act 
2013 (Qld) was assented to on 29 April 2013. 
110 Electronic Conveyancing National Law (ECNL) (Appendix to Electronic Conveyancing (Adoption of National Law) 
Act 2012 (NSW)), s 13. 
111  ECNL, above n 110, s 8. 
112  The Model Participation Rules are available at the ARNECC website < http://www.arnecc.gov.au/home>. ECNL, 
above n 110, s 23, provides that the Registrar in each jurisdiction has the power to determine participation rules which 
will apply to the Subscribers. To ensure national consistency, ECNL, above n 110, s 24 requires the Registrars to have 
regard to Model Participation Rules developed by ARNECC. ARNECC released the first draft of the “Proposed Model 
Participation Rules: Exposure Draft” on 30 March 2012. At the time of writing, the current version is dated April 2013: 
ARNECC “Proposed Model Participation Rules” (April 2013) <www.arnecc.gov.au> [Model Rules]. 
113  There is no parallel in Australia to this in terms of paper-based conveyancing. 
114  Sch 8, cl 1 defines Person Being Identified as “any of the Persons required to be identified under Participation Rules 
6.5.1 (a) to (f)”. 
 (b) where the Person Being Identified is a Member of the Australian Defence Force, a Competent 
Officer.[115] 
 
The Model Rules also specify that the Subscriber may use an Agent to verify the identity of a person 
(sch 8, cl 9). 
Schedule 8, clause 10 requires the Subscriber or the Subscriber’s agent to undertake further steps 
to verify identity where the subscriber or its agent knows or ought reasonably to know that: 
 
(a)  any identity Document produced by the Person Being Identified … is not genuine; or 
(b)  any photography on an identity Document produced … is not a reasonable likeness of the Person 
Being Identified …; or 
(c)  if it would otherwise be reasonable to do so. 
 
Finally on the issue of the first proof requirement, the Model Rules provide that the Subscriber need 
not verify identity in accordance with the Verification of Identity Standard if the Subscriber has a 
face-to-face interview with the person being identified and has within the previous 24 months verified 
the identity of the person in accordance with this Standard (sch 8, cl 11). 
(2) Second and third proof requirement 
In terms of the second and third proof requirement, ownership and entitlement to deal, the Subscriber 
must establish that their Client “is entitled to enter into the Conveyancing Transaction(s) identified in 
the Client Authorisation”.116 There is however no explanation or direction as to how the Subscriber is 
to achieve this. This is to be left to each State to determine. 
However, in New South Wales, recognition of the role played by the certificate of title in terms of 
evidencing ownership and right to deal have resulted in several reports prepared by the law firm 
Clayton Utz on behalf of the New South Wales Land Registry.117 The reports examined to what extent 
the “functionality and risk management currently provided by the CT [certificate of title] continue for 
… electronic conveyancing” once this is introduced.118 
Helpfully, what is explicitly recognised in the reports is that the control of the right to deal 
(CoRD), the equivalent of our third proof requirement, is separate from the second proof requirement, 
confirmation of ownership. A CT/CoRD holder has a right to be consulted about the registration of 
most dealings on the title and the right to refuse consent to the registration of most dealings unless 
compelled by the Registrar-General. This therefore gives the registered proprietor who has the 
CT/CoRD some protection against fraudulent dealing with the title by requiring a separate act of 
producing the CT. It also gives the first-ranking registered mortgagee with the CT/CoRD a right of 
veto over the creation of later interests (especially subsequent mortgages) by the registered 
proprietor.119 
Clayton Utz recognise that in Queensland safeguards were introduced, including mandating who 
could witness documents.120 However: 121 
 
                                                 
115  Sch 8, cl 1 defines this term as having “the meaning given to it in the Defence Force Regulations 1952 (Cth)”. 
116  Model Participation Rules, cl 6.4. 
117  Proof of ownership is not dealt with specifically in the ECNL or the Model Participation Rules, but as noted above, part 
II C, proof of ownership is often, by itself, all the necessary proof of an entitlement to deal. Thus in most cases, both 
these proofs are dealt with together. 
118  Clayton Utz Certificate of Title Solution for Concurrent Electronic & Paper-based Conveyancing (New South Wales 
Land Registry, 22 September 2011) at 1.2. 
119  Clayton Utz, above n 118, at 1.4. As noted in Land and Property Information (NSW) “NEC News” (3 November 2012) 
<www.lpi.nsw.gov.au>: “A Party has CoRD when that party has authority to consent to the registration of a subsequent 
interest in land. CoRD has been traditionally evidenced by legitimate possession of the paper Certificate of Title”. 
120  Clayton Utz, above n 118, at 1.6. 
121  Clayton Utz, above n 118. 
 “CoRD and prescribed witnessing of signatures on instruments have different aims and different effects. 
They are not interchangeable nor readily comparable as to aim or effect. To attempt to compare risk 
management in a CoRD based conveyancing system with risk mitigation in a No CoRD system using 
prescribed witnessing of party signatures on instruments is to compare chalk and cheese.” 
 
(3) General comments 
The authors’ opinion is that the proposed ECNL and Model Participation Rules satisfy the first proof 
requirement, proof of identity of the applicant, better than the old manual system. There is however an 
unsatisfactory paucity of information available on the issue of the second and third proof requirement, 
that is proof of ownership of the title interest and proof of entitlement to deal. Certainly the New 
South Wales proposal to retain some equivalent of the outstanding duplicate (although it is not clear 
how this would be done in an automated environment) suggests an awareness at least in that State of 
the need for at least the second proof requirement, proof of ownership of the title interest, and perhaps 
the third as well, proof of entitlement to deal. 
It is heartening, however, that under the proposed ECNL the actual acceptance of dealings for 
registration is still intended to be handled by Registry staff, trained for that purpose, who will fulfil 
the ongoing task of policing the Register. At least in principle, this holds out hope for a degree of 
scrutiny of dealings concerning issues of proof of ownership of the title interest and proof of 
entitlement to deal. 
Based on what we know to date, we summarise our assessment of the two systems in the table 
below. 
 
Proof Requirements Landonline NECS 
Identity of applicant Generally satisfactory for most 
instances. Section 164A(3). 
Satisfactory. A combination of 
cl 6.5, Verification of Identity 
Standard and Registry staff 
policing function.  
Proof of ownership Deficient. Production of a local 
body rates notice, bank 
statements or similar.  
Not yet known. Will vary from 
State to State.   Possibly CoRD 
principles will operate in NSW. 
Entitlement to deal Deficient.  By s 164A  
practitioners act as de facto 
registrars in accepting the 
dealing for registration.  
Not yet known. Will vary from 
State to State.  Possibly the 
operation of CoRD principlesin 
NSW will assist. Registry staff 
in all States will still undertake 
policing function. 
Assessment The first proof requirement 
looks generally satisfactory. 
There are a serious lack of 
credible controls for the second 
and third proof requirement. 
The first proof requirement 
looks credible. It is not clear 
how the second and third proof 
requirement will be satisfied on 
a State by State basis. 
 
In the next section we contextualise our assessment against three examples of Torrens abuse. Our 
discussion here assists our assessment of the degree to which the two automated systems meet the 
three proof requirements. 
V  Queensland — The Perrin Fraud 
 In Commonweath of Australia v Perrin the husband of the registered proprietor forged her signature 
and that of the witness on two mortgages.122 On default the bank sued to recover its losses.123 The 
bank had left all relevant documents with the husband for signature and had not made contact with his 
wife. The couple’s solicitors who were holding the duplicate title had released it to the husband 
without requiring authorisation from the wife, being the registered proprietor.124 
Under the provisions governing the New Zealand Landonline system, as the wife had an existing 
relationship with the bank, the execution of the security documents would have been classed as a 
routine transaction. This means verifying identity via an original government-issued photographic 
identification document would have sufficed. The need to produce the wife’s photographic 
identification document might have prevented the fraud because it might have alerted her to the fact 
that her husband was attempting to deal with her property without her consent. 
In Australia, under the proposed NECS, a Subscriber who failed to verify identity and the right to 
deal would be liable for failing to verify identity. Obviously, a face-to-face interview with the wife by 
the bank as Subscriber would have revealed that she was unaware of the mortgage fraud. 
The following table represents our assessment of Landonline and NECS in relation to the the 
Perrin. 
 
Proof Requirements Landonline NECS 
Identity of applicant Generally satisfactory.  The 
transaction would be a 
routine transaction — 
identity verification via 
photographic ID required. 
Adequate.  Commonwealth Bank as 
Subscriber would need to perform 
verification of identity of the mortgagor, 
Mrs Perrin, via face-to-face verification 
of identity. 
Proof of ownership Deficient. Landonline 
requirements (such as 
production of the rates 
certificate) could easily 
have been met. Person 
committing the fraud had 
access to these documents. 
Uncertain. Commonwealth Bank as 
Subscriber would need to establish Mrs 
Perrin’s entitlement to enter into the 
mortgage. The necessity to obtain 
authority under CoRD principles which 
may apply in NSW could have averted 
the fraud, but it is uncertain whether or 
how these principles will  apply in NECS 
and may vary from State to State.  
Entitlement to deal Deficient. There is no 
requirement under 
Landonline to establish that 
the husband had the 
entitlement to deal on 
behalf of the wife. This 
would routinely be 
accepted. 
As above.  
Assessment  Concerning.  The attempt at 
fraud may have been 
discovered at the identity 
verification stage.  The 
other protections are not 
credible. 
Uncertain.  The attempt at fraud should 
have been discovered early because the 
Bank, by complying with the 
requirements for face-to-face identity 
verification, would not have acted on Mr 
Perrin’s instructions without confirming 
with Mrs Perrin first. The application of 
CoRD principles in NSW may also have 
                                                 
122  Perrin, above n 5, at [2]. 
123  At [3]. 
124  At [26]. 
 made fraud more difficult, but NECS 
principles may be applied differently on 
a State by State basis. 
 
VI  Western Australia Fraud — Mildenhall 
Mr Mildenhall’s claims were settled and did not therefore result in a judgment, but the case 
nonetheless makes an instructive example.125 Whilst he was living overseas, Mr Mildenhall’s 
unencumbered investment property was sold by fraudsters operating out of Nigeria. On finding out 
about the sale through an acquaintance, he returned to Perth, to find a second property sold by the 
fraudsters, but not yet settled. 
It appears the fraudsters had intercepted Mr Mildenhall’s mail and had thus become familiar with 
details of the property. With this knowledge, the fraudsters, pretending to be the owner, instructed a 
real estate agent to sell the properties, by use of an e-mail account previously used by Mr Mildenhall. 
By e-mail, the fraudsters provided an overseas telephone address for contact purposes. Mr 
Mildenhall’s signatures on the contract of sale and ensuing transfer documents were forged. 
Verification of identity was purportedly performed by a Notary Public in Nigeria.126 Once the 
transaction had settled, the sale proceeds were forwarded to a bank in China. When the news broke on 
Mr Mildenhall’s plight, another similar scam came to light.127 
Under Landonline, where an instruction is obtained from a client overseas, the issue is considered 
as being within the “high risk” category. This requires certification of identity by a Notary Public 
acting in that overseas jurisdiction. On the facts, this may have been able to be provided, as the 
documentation was returned from Nigeria witnessed by a party who purported to be a Notary Public 
acting in that jurisdiction. However, given the public notoriety of Nigeria as a haven for international 
online scams this fact alone might have alerted the solicitor within New Zealand to be on guard. 
Under the proposed NECS in Australia, because Mr Mildenhall was overseas, the verification of 
identity will be required to be conducted by an Australian Consular Office or an Australian 
Diplomatic Officer (sch 8, cl 8 Rules). We argue that this would have made it more difficult for the 
fraud to be perpetrated. In addition, there were certain discrepancies in Mr Mildenhall’s case that 
would have warranted further steps to be taken by the Subscriber, in accordance with sch 8, cl 10 — 
the instructions in the e-mail to the Subscriber were in poor English and there was a change of the 
vendor’s contact details before the listing. This would also have alerted the Subscriber to the fraud 
and likely stopped the fraud from occurring. 
The following table represents our assessment of Landonline and NECS in relation to the 
Mildenhall fraud. 
                                                 
125  The facts are gleaned from Eileen Webb “Scammers Target WA Real Estate Transactions” (2010) Australian Property 
Law Bulletin 186; LavanLegal “Recent property scam means Landgate should introduce pin numbers” (October 2010) 
<www.lavanlegal.com.au>; “Landgate begins search for property fraud victims” (11 August 2011) 
<www.news.com.au>. See also Low and Griggs, above n 3, at 369–371. 
126  Webb, above n 125, at 187. It is not clear whether a false certificate of title was created based on false documentation or 
whether the scammers were able to obtain the certificate of title (for example, tricking the Land Registry to issue a new 
certificate). 
127  That fraud occurred in February and March of 2008, and involved a Perth doctor. Dr Peter D’Allessandro said he was 
10 days from settlement on a West Perth apartment when the legitimate owner, who had been living in South Africa, 
found out about the sale and brought the process to a halt. The property had been on the market without the legitimate 
owner’s knowledge and was to be sold for $775,000. Dr D’Allessandro said the e-mail address used for correspondence 
with the agent was traced to Nigeria. Police investigated the fraud in 2008 but it was not resolved. More recently, WA 
police authorities have been reported as investigating allegations that another house has been sold in Perth without the 
owner knowing. Police say they have been told that a home in the suburb of Ballajura, worth around $400,000, was 
recently sold by Nigerian scammers. In both cases, the owners were overseas and in both cases the sale proceeded 
without any face-to-face interaction between the ‘owners’ and the estate and settlement agents. 
  
Proof Requirements Landonline  NECS 
Identity of applicant 
 
Uncertain. High Risk 
transaction, higher obligations 
imposed. Given the “Nigerian” 
connection, it is hoped a 
practitioner under Landonline 
would have been put on guard, 
and made further enquiries. 
Uncertain. Requirement of using an 
Australian Consular Officer or an 
Australian Diplomatic Officer may 
reduce the likelihood of fraud. 
Proof of ownership Deficient. As people 
committing the fraud could 
mislead lenders and realty 
agents into believing that they 
were the owner, it is likely 
they could similarly produce 
documents which would give 
the appearance of ownership. 
Uncertain. The operation of CoRD 
principles in NSW may have averted 
fraud. 
Entitlement to deal Deficient. Relevant parties 
such as conveyancers, 
mortgagees and real estate 
agents not required to 
separately establish an 
entitlement to deal.  
Uncertain. Subscriber would need to 
establish entitlement to deal. Again 
adoption of CoRD principles may 
have assisted. 
Assessment  Generally deficient. Prevention 
of this fraud may have been 
possible, depending on the 
vigilance of the solicitors 
handling the transaction. 
Uncertain. Requirement for identity 
verification coupled with the need to 
undertake further steps to verify 
identity may have made the fraud 
more difficult to perpetrate under 
NECS.  
 
VII  New Zealand — Warin 
In Warin v Registrar-General of Land128 the Māori Trustee sold a piece of Māori land without 
obtaining the necessary court order under the Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993 (TTWMA). The 
transfer was therefore a void dealing at law, but was accepted by the Registry. This caused the 
purchaser to claim a Torrens protected title, free from the alienation constraints affecting the land 
under the TTWMA. 
In giving judgment, the High Court reflected the importance and primacy of certainty of Torrens 
registration,129 leading to the finding that the indefeasibility of the Land Transfer Act trumped various 
provisions in the TTWMA.130 This finding was made despite a ready recognition by the Court that 
payment of compensation for loss of land was not an adequate form of recompense. This is because 
Māori land was “regarded as a taonga and not to be surrendered”.131 
                                                 
128 Warin, above n 6. 
129  At [125] the Court opined: “Security of title by registration lies at the very heart of this country’s system of land 
ownership.” 
130  This was by reference to Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, ss 156 and 228(3). 
131  Warin, above n 6, at [131]. “Taonga” may be loosely translated as inalienable treasure. 
 As already indicated, the Registrar-General of New Zealand has indicated that in the future known 
Māori land titles will be flagged on Landonline for manual registration when submitted.132 This will 
no doubt be a gradual process. The issue is not, however, limited to Māori land.133 Reported cases 
exist from both New Zealand and Australian jurisdictions of registration of other void and voidable 
dealings which are made effective and protected by indefeasibility, once registered.134 Reference is 
again made to the 23 statutory provisions practitioners undertake will not be contravened by operating 
Landonline.135 
Warin highlights a fundamental difference between Landonline and NECS in that under NECS 
lodgement will not lead to automatic registration. As already discussed, Australian registries will still 
run their own checks before updating the Register, although this may differ in effect from State to 
State. 
The following table represents our assessment of the Warin registration under NECS and 
Landonline. 
 
Proof Requirements Landonline NECS 
Identity of applicant 
 
Not an issue. Not an issue. 
Proof of ownership Not an issue. Not an issue. 
Entitlement to deal Deficient. There is a reliance on 
practitioner undertakings with 
no checks being undertaken. 
Although this is being remedied 
for Māori land, concern remains 
for other vulnerable land. 
Uncertain. However, retention of 
a role for Registry staff in 
policing registration suggests 
some semblance of protection 
will be maintained. 
Assessment  Deficient. The system is 
vulnerable to abuse by both 
fraud and inappropriate 
registration. 
Uncertain. The result will depend 
on individual States’ operating 
procedures in undertaking 
registration. 
 
VIII  Conclusion 
Businesses have embraced technology — from the use of faxes to e-mail to storing data on computer 
systems and now, with the advent of cloud computing, storing data ‘in the cloud’. Land registration 
systems need to embrace this technology. 
The issue is not whether manual land registration systems should be automated, but how this is 
done in ways that protect the integrity of the Register and the concept of indefeasibility. We have 
taken the line that any new automated system should at least be as credible as the manual system it is 
intended to replace. The old manual system, as designed, adopted an overlapping prophylactic 
approach concerning the three proof requirements. Thus a number of overlapping protective measures 
had to be overcome before the benefits of indefeasibility could be obtained. 
In summary, we consider Landonline does not offer the same level of protection as the old manual 
system as it was originally designed. Further information is needed to make a comparable assessment 
                                                 
132  My Law Society, above n 96. 
133  Greenwood and Jones, above n 14, at 335 suggest “reserve land” will be flagged on Landonline, so dealings with that 
land “cannot be registered via eDealing”. It is uncertain to what extent, if at all, this has occurred to date. 
134  Inappropriate grants of easements; conveyances without authority; mortgages registered with unauthorised alterations; 
titles acquired in breach of statutory prohibition; dealings registered notwithstanding abuses of powers of attorney, 
without payment of required stamp duty or in breaches of subdivisional constraints: see Butt, above n 2, at [20.19], n 
123. 
135  See the earlier discussion explaining the operation of Landonline: part IV A (3) above. 
 for the anticipated Australian system. In terms of identity of the applicant, the first proof requirement, 
both systems are credible. However, concerns remain around the second and third proof requirements, 
being proof of ownership of the title interest and proof of entitlement to deal. 
Of the two systems, Landonline appears to be the less secure, given its primary focus is on proof 
of identity of the applicant. Proof of ownership of the title (the second proof requirement) is addressed 
by production of secondary, easily forgeable records not generated for the purpose of providing proof 
of ownership. Likewise with regard to entitlement to deal (the third proof requirement) there is 
reliance on practitioner undertakings without input by Registry staff before the dealing is accepted for 
registration. This raises the worrying prospect that if the first proof requirement (identity of the 
applicant) is overcome there are no significant impediments to fraudulent or improper dealings taking 
place. 
Details of how the second and third proof requirements are to be implemented under the 
anticipated NECS system are not yet clear, given each State is to introduce its own domestic Torrens 
registration systems under the umbrella of the ECNL. However, the adoption of measures such as the 
New South Wales CoRD system, and retention of Registry staff to police compliance and actually 
register the dealings gives hope that, at least in New South Wales, all three proof requirements will be 
credible, with overlapping controls. 
The examples of the Perrin and Mildenhall frauds go some way to illustrate the issues that may 
arise. Where land is particularly vulnerable, as was demonstrated in the New Zealand case of Warin, 
the only solution against abuse may be to retain manual checking by Registry staff.136 
The issue of a credible system is fundamental to Torrens jurisdictions. As stated by Arruñada:137 
 
A benefit of agent registration is the immediacy of result. However, this benefit may be illusory because 
it is likely that agency registration will debase a registry of rights into a recording of deeds. 
 
While we accept that criticism such as ours should be followed by positive proposals framed by 
use of the three proof requirements, such proposals are not lightly given, and are beyond the scope of 
this article. They will be addressed in a further article indicating how automation can be used to 
advantage in order to provide a more secure Torrens system. There is a public interest in ensuring the 
integrity of land registration systems. A debased Torrens registration system endangers fundamentals 
of our legal system. Not only is the housing market fundamental to all citizens, but security of 
property interests remains of key concern to continued commercial confidence. 
 
                                                 
136  Consequentially, there may be benefit in the proposal put forward by the New Zealand Law Commission (for 
Landonline) giving the court a discretion to overturn titles that are otherwise indefeasible. See Law Commission, above 
n 13, at 82–83. However, the issue arises of where the threshold for overturning titles should lie. Too low a threshold 
disturbs the concept of immediate indefeasibility and reintroduces, by the back door, concepts of deferred 
indefeasibility. See further Thomas, above n 1, at [VI]. 
137  Arruñada, above n 55, at 118. Arruñada also makes the following observation (at 118): “… substituting the human 
registrar with computer software — is more difficult. It is costly in terms of both the effort to develop the system and 
the contractual constraints which will be imposed as a consequence. It is also risky in terms of fraud.” 
